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COMPUTATION OF WAGE LOSS DURING
THE DEPRESSION UNDER THE WORK-
MEN'S COMPENSATION ACTS
MICHAEL LEVIN
S INCE the enactment of the Wisconsin Workmen's Compensation
Act,' many of the vexatious problems of personal injury litigation
between employer and employee have been eliminated, and the field
of law governing the relationship of master and servant has been ma-
terially affected. The questions of liability and non-liability, the de-
fenses of fellow servant, assumption of risk, and contributory negli-
gence are no longer before the courts. Through this statute the state
has endeavored to eliminate the troublesome and expensive luxury known
as personal injury litigation, substituting, in effect, a system whereby
every employee may receive reasonable recompense for injuries acci-
dentally sustained in the course of his employment, without recourse
to a lawsuit and the resulting friction. 2
The simple hypothesis underlying the theory of the Workmen's
Compensation Act was that industry should bear the economic loss of
individuals and their families brought about by injuries or death occur-
ring within the scope of employment. The theory is predicated upon
two basic conclusions; that the loss occasioned by human injury or
death should be added to the costs of the industry responsible for
such loss, and that, instead of spending large sums for the investiga-
tion and litigation incidental to a prolonged dispute over claims, it
would be far more practical to direct such money to a useful purpose,
that is, to indemnify the persons who have suffered the physical and
economic loss. It was obvious that the prevailing haphazard tactics
which existed between employer and employee prior to this legislation,
fostering as they did a bitter and resentful relationship between the
parties, did little to assuage the hardships born by victims of industrial
accidents.
The realization of the growing need for a more logical solution of
these problems brought about the passage of the Compensation Act,
and as the public grew to understand and accept the principle of em-
ployer liability in industrial accidents, there came a demand for inclu-
sion of the more intangible field of occupational disease. Having im-
posed upon industry the liability for work accidents through the strip-
ping away of defenses in master and servant actions, it followed logic-
ally that, as a corollary to the Compensation Act, the matter of indem-
IWis. Laws 1911, c. 50.
2 See Borgnis v. Falk, 147 Wis. 327, 337, 133 N.\V. 209 (1911).
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nity for occupational disease should be included therein. It seemed rea-
sonable that if industry should rightfully bear the burden of industrial
accidents, it should just as rightfully bear the cost of occupational dis-
ease.3 In 1919 the Wisconsin Legislature enacted such a law.4
The problem of interpreting this law became a matter for judicial
decision, and attempts to sustain it have severely taxed the resource-
fulness of the courts.5 Unlike the more easily administered accident
compensation measure, the problem of indemnity for occupational dis-
ease has not, and perhaps never will become a simple or clearly de-
fined mater. The time and place of an accident are easily established.
There is now no serious question as to the constitutionality or justice
.of employer liability for industrial accidents, and it is no longer diffi-
cult to determine where such liability shall attach. But as to indemnity
for occupational disease, serious questions still exist. No clearly recog-
nized right can be said to exist whereby the worker is entitled to com-
pensation for damages resulting from occupational disease. In Wiscon-
sin this right is purely statutory, finding no premise or analogy in the
common law. It has been suggested that the risk of such disability
should be born by the worker as well as the employer, as it is a risk
inherent and incidental to the occupation which the worker has volun-
tarily chosen. Theoretically, this doctrine may seem tenable, but when
analyzed in the light of present day realities such reasoning becomes
mere sophistry. Nor can it be said that an administrative board, even
with the advantage of medical advice, is able unerringly to determine
whether a diseased condition resulted entirely from a present employ-
ment. The query arises as to whether it is proper to impose full liabil-
ity upon the present employer, or should the previous employer bear
the burden of the award if it is shown that such employment contrib-
uted to the injury? If so, from what principle or law does such liabil-
ity derive, and for how long shall potential liability continue in respect
to a former employer? Coupled with these questions is the problem
of determining damages, intangible and conjectural as they necessarily
are, keeping in mind the constitutional questions involved in the method
of computation and amount awarded, ever considering the elements of
continuous or discontinuous employment. It thus becomes evident that
the courts have had to abandon certain established principles and chart
3 "Occupational disease as well as industrial accidents is a part of the expenses
and ravage of industry." See /is Granite Co. v. Ind. Com., 208 Wis. 270,
273, 242 N.W. 191 (1932).
4 VWis. Laws 1919, c. 457 (effective July 5, 1919), c. 458.
S"The right of an employee to compensation for an occupational disease hangs
by a slender thread. * * * It has required no little judicial ingenuity to save
the right in many cases where the legislature * * * seemed to intend com-
pensations to be paid." See Nordberg Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Cowmn., 210 Wis. 398,
403, 245 N.W. 680 (1933).
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new law in order to preserve for the worker that protection which the
legislature seemed to intend.
The recent depression has created many situations of re-employ-
ment and new employment, and the medical examinations necessarily
conducted have revealed many instances of previously unsuspected
occupational disease among workers in fairly hazardous industries,
particularly foundries, granite quarries, and the like. It was found
that a portion of these workers were suffering from silicosis and tuber-
culosis, superinduced by pneumonoconiosis developed in the course of
their employment. Claims were filed in these cases, and the wide pub-
licity given the matter induced other workers, engaged in the same
or similar occupations, to seek medical attention, with a resulting flood
of claims for occupational illness. Awards granted to claimants for oc
cupational diseases have been so large that liability insurance com-
panies have sought to withdraw coverage in industries where silicosis
and like diseases develop.
G
An introduction to the problems existing under the act including re-
cent developments in the growing field of occupational disease, is nec-
essary to a complete portrayal of the problem of computing wage loss
during the depression. This matter had never before been serious, but
the depression brought certain complications. Previously, in order to
bring both parties under the act, it was necessary to establish only the
relationship of employer and employee, coupled with an injury or oc-
cupational disease arising out of this relationship.7 When the parties
were found to come within the scope of the act, the statutory scheme
applied, the annual wage being computed as three hundred times the
average daily wage, and where no other questions were involved the
award was made promptly and paid. However, as industrial activity
became staggered, as employment declined to new low levels, as Con-
gress and the various legislatures attempted to distribute employment
among the greatest number of workers, a serious question arose con-
cerning the best method of wage computation." The Wisconsin statute
and the statutes of other states had carefully provided for com-
putation under the previously existing circumstances, but such meth-
ods, as interpreted during times of continuous employment, were found
inapplicable to depression conditions. The courts, therefore, were
obliged to abandon the previously applied schemes and search further
6 See Wis. Granite Co. v. Ind. Com m., 208 W,'is. 270, 274, 242 N.W. 191 (1932).
See Conveyor Corp. v. Ind. Comm., 200 Wis. 512, 228 N.W. 118 (1930).8 The earliest case considering these questions in this country was Andrejewski
v. Wolverine Coal Co., 182 Mich. 298, 148 N.W. 684 (1914). Of occupational
disease it is said in Vis. Granite Co. v. Id. Comm., 208 Wis. 270, 242 N.W.
191 (1932): "When occupational disease was made compensable under the
machinery and pursuant to the provisions set up for the compensation of in-
dustrial accidents, the arising of anomalous situations became inevitable."
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into the statutes for a method with which to cope with these new
conditions. 9
The Wisconsin Act, similar for the most part to those of other
states, provides three general methods for the computation of an em-
ployee's average annual earnings, a) If he has been employed in the
same type of work for substantially all of the preceding year, such
earnings shall amount to three hundred times his average daily wage.' 0
b) If he has not been so employed, his earnings shall amount to three
Ihundred times the average daily wage of an employee of the same or
similar class engaged in the same or similar employment and locality
for substantially all of the preceding year." c) If the foregoing meth-
ods cannot fairly and reasonably be applied, then the employee's earn-
ings are to be ascertained as that sum which reasonably represents his
annual earning capacity in the employment in which he was injured,
taking into consideration his previous earnings and the earnings of
other employees in the same or most similar employment in the same
locality. 2 The average daily wage used in computation under the first
and second methods is to be determined on the basis of an eight hour
day, unless a day of fewer hours has been established through agree-
ment or custom.' 3 The average weekly wage, upon which basis the
amount of weekly compensation is determined under the act, consists
of one fiftieth of the average annual earning ;14 and the percentage of
such weekly wage given as compensation must bear a reasonable rela-
tion to the loss of earning capacity in the employment at the time of
the injury or disability.' 5
The first method of computing average annual wage covered a great
proportion of the cases arising prior to the depression. In times of con-
tinuous employment there is little turnover and consequently little
shifting from job to job, and thus most of the claimants were workers
of long standing whose records of wages extended back over a period
of many years. It was not difficult to determine the earnings of work-
ers in this classification. But as employment became staggered and in-
termittent, the number of workers in this class declined. Great num-
bers of men accepted jobs of temporary duration; others continued
working at the same job, but only during periods when the industry
9 "Exactly as these laws were passed to meet or remedy a great economic and
social problem which modern industrialism has forced upon us, * * * so has
the depression brought about many serious problems for determination by the
court. It might well be said that lawyers not only have been required to 're-
learn the law,' but 'learn new law."' Borgnis v. Falk Co., 147 Wis. 327, 133
N.W. 209 (1911).
30Wis. STATS. (1933) § 102.11 (2) (a).
"Wis. STATS. (1933) § 102.11 (2) (b).
12WsS. STATS. (1933) § 102.11 (2) (c).
1"WIs.-STATS. (1933) § 102.11 (2) (d).
34 WIs. STATS. (1933) § 102.11 (1).
1"WIs. STATS. (1933) § 102.11 (5).
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operated; and still others found steady but part-time employment. The
first method of computation was inapplicable in circumstances such
as these, for the essential element, continuous employment upon an
eight hour basis, was lacking.
It was thought by some that the second method, that of basing the
computation upon the experience of a worker of the same or 'similar
class, could be used in these situations, but a consideration of the con-
sequences attending such computation dispels the idea. Certain indus-
tries have succeeded throughout the entire period of the depression
in giving their employees full time employment, while other industries
engaged in the same or a similar business have not been as fortunate.
Now consider the problem brought about by an injury to a worker
employed by an industry resuming operations after a prolonged period
of inactivity and where such operations are known to be of temporary
duration. Would it be equitable to bage compensation upon the em-
ployment experience of workers engaged in similar employment in a
similar industry which had operated continuously ?7" Consider the case
of a night watchman, taken on under a share-the-work plan after sev-
eral years of unemployment, and injured shortly after his employment.
Is it equitable to base compensation in this case upon the employment
experience of the full time, higher paid watchman whom the additional
workers had displaced, multiplying by three hundred his average daily
wage to determine the average annual earnings of the part time, tem-
porary employee? The Wisconsin court has held, in instances such
as these, that the proper method for computation is that outlined under
(c), that the alternative employee whose record was taken as the stand-
ard was not an employee of the same class, therefore not subject to
comparison. 17 Compensation under (b) is computed on the same basis
as that under (a), considering that the circumstances are such that
while the employee has not worked at the job in which the injury was
16 "The true test is ** * what were his earnings in a normal week regard being
had to the known and recognized incidents of the employment. If work is
discontinuous, that is an element which cannot be overlooked." Anslow v. Car-
mock Chase Colliery Co., Ltd., [1909] A.C. 435, 78 L.J.K.B. 679, 25 T.L.R. 570,
2 B.W.C.C. 365.
17 "In determining what 'reasonably represented' deceased's earning capacity, the
commission entirely disregarded 'the previous earnings of the employee.' It
considered that the previous watchman was an employee of the same or most
similar class, and took his annual earnings as the sole measure of the earning
capacity of the deceased 'at the time of his injury' in disregard of the stated
terms of his employment and the existing absence of opportunity to procure
constant and regular employment." Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Contra.,
'(Wis. 1935) 255 N.W. 887. Speaking of the matter of awarding compensation
upon a full-time basis in cases where claimants' employment had been inter-
mittent and discontinuous during the preceding year, it is said, "To apply sub-
division (b) ** * would give rise to grave questions as to the constitutionality
of the statute." Marshall v. Andrew F. Mahoney Co., 56 F. (2d) 74 (C.C.A.
9th, 1932), quoted with approval in Allis-Chalmners Mfg. "Co. v. Ind. Comm.,
(Wis. 1934) 255 N.W. 887.
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sustained during substantially the whole of such preceding year, never-
theless there was opportunity and ability to do such work either on
behalf of the employer where he was employed, or for some other
employer in the same industry and neighborhood. The plan presup-
poses a condition of continuous employment available to the injured
employee or actually experienced by some other employee, and there-
fore is not suitable to conditions of discontinuous employment.
It would seem, at first glance, that the method of computation of-
fered under (c) would provide the solution of this problem of wage
computation, but here, too, there are certain situations not adequately
covered. This plan doubtless was included to take care of conditions
existing in seasonal industries, s and while some of the problems in-
volved in seasonal employment are found to exist during depression
periods, not all of the issues are identical. Seasonal employment, as
such, is fairly constant, that is, the periods of activity and inactivity
recur regularly throughout the years. A standard and a norm is not
difficult to establish. The workers engaged in such industries have
similar employment records, and the matter of computation is not a
great problem. Since corresponding industries have like periods
of activity and comparisons may be accurately made between
the workers of similar industries, the average annual earning
capacity of an injured employee is not hard to determine un-
der these circumstances. But in the event that the work is staggered
and the employment is part time and intermittent, or that there have
been frequent shifts in employment, or that the injury occurred while
the employee was performing work which gave no employment suffi-
ciently continuous to "estimate annual earnings, what standard could be
used as a basis for computing the average annual earning capacity men-
tioned in the act ? 9 When the law was enacted it was necessary to
evolve some basis for computation. It was deemed fair and proper
at that time that computation should be on the basis of average annual
earnings during the preceding year. Whether this basis is fair and just
under depression conditions is a question for the legislature, but it
cannot be disputed that, in order to preserve the fundamental, underly-
ing principle of the present act, that of compensation for actual eco-
nomic loss, some such standard must be maintained.2 0
28 CRYSTAL EASTMAN, WORK ACcIDENTS AND THE LAW, app. § 15, 210.
29 See note 16 supra.
20 A startling illustration of what may happen under other methods of computa-
tion is found in North End Foundry v. Ind. Comm., (Wis. 1935) 258 N.W.
439. Here five employees, working respectively 13, 15, 16, 21% and 38 per cent
of the preceding year, claimed compensation for loss of earning capacity
through occupational disease. The Commission awarded compensation on the
maximum .basis with the result that one of the claimants received an award
six and one-halt times greater than his earnings during the previous year.(On appeal the Circuit Court directed an award on the basis of previous
earnings. The judgment on the awards was set aside in the Supreme Court
on other grounds.)
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The court, in considering this problem, has held that the compensa-
tion must bear a reasonable relation to the loss sustained by the em-
ployee or his dependants by reason of the injury or death.2 1 This, in
effect, is the very essence of the statute. The act contemplates compen-
sation for loss of earning capacity actually sustained, not insurance or
damages for injury. Earning capacity, the loss of which constitutes the
compensable factor, is defined by the court as "willingness to work
coupled with the opportunity to work."2 2 If this earning capacity is
partially or totally impaired by reason of an injury sustained during
the course of employment, the employer is liable to the full extent
of such loss. But the loss, as computed, must be actual. Potential earn-
ing capacity may not be considered where the record shows the actual
capacity at the time of the injury.23 If such capacity appears low be-
cause of past inability to obtain continuous employment, it is not within
the scope of administrative power to arbitrarily increase such capacity
to an amount more nearly reasonable in the light of normal condi-
tions.24 This essential, "the opportunity to work," is a risk to be born
by the worker, not the employer, and where earning capacity .is de-
creased because of discontinuous employment, this is a factor to be
considered in a determination of the actual loss sustained by virtue of
the injury.25
21 Presque Isle v. Ind. Comm., 200 Wis. 446, 228 N.W. 589 (1930).
22" * ** earning capacity means fitness and readiness and willingness to work,
considered in connection with opportunity to work; and fitness and oppor-
tunity must go hand in hand. Claimant was ready and fit, and risk of oppor-
tunity was his * * *." Marshall v. Andrew F. Mahoney Co. 56 F. (2d) 74
(C.C.A. 9th, 1932). See also Lukenbach S. S. Co. v. Marshall, 49 F. (2d) 625(D. C. Ore. 1931); Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Clarke, 59 F. (2d)
595 (C. A. A. 4th, 1932); Mahaffey v. lnd. Acc. Comm., 176 Cal. 711,
171 Pac. 298 (1917); Sugars v. Ohio Match Co., 53 Idaho 408, 23 P. (2d)
.743 (1933); Gilnore & P. R. Co. v. Benedict, 53 Idaho 208, 23 P. (2d)
742 (1933); Senne v. Binkley Mining Co., (Ind. 1933) 187 N.E. 842; Beau-
lieu's case, (Me. 1934) 171 Atl. 696; Ethier's case, (Mass. 1934) 189 N.E.
808; Oklahoma City v. Arnold, (Okla. 1933) 25 P. (2d) 651; Little v. Fuller
Co., 223 N.Y. 334, 119 N.E. 554 (1918); Geroux v. McClintic-Marshall Co.,
225 App. Div. 434, 233 N.Y.S. 402 (1929) (Seasonable and intermittent em-
ployment); Orlando v. Snider Packing Corp., 230 App. Div. 557, 246 N.Y.S.
224 (1930); Daint v. Schreier Contracting Co., 235 App. Div. 478, 257 N.Y.S.
705 (1932); Barlog v. Board of Water Commissioners, City of Dunkirk, 239
App. Div. 225, 267 N.Y.S. 822 (1933) ; Remnmert v. Weidemeyer, 196 App. Div.
529, 188 N.E. 52 (1933) (Intermittent employment. Worked one to three days
a week); San Martin v. Rock & Sons Co., (Vt. 1934) 172 AtI. 635.
2 See note 17 supra.
24 Welhouse v. Ind. Corm., 214 Wis. 163, 252 N.W. 717 (1934).
25 "Reduction in earning capacity occasioned by general business conditions and
not due to the injury should not be considered. The statute contemplates that
compensation is to be paid for diminished capacity to earn wages; and the
employee, in common with others, must bear the loss resulting from business
depression." Capone's Case, 239 Mass. 331, 132 N.E. 32, 33 (1921). See
also Littler v. Fuller Co., 223 N.Y. 369, 119 N.E. 554 (1918); San Mar-
tin v. Rock & Sons, (Vt. 1934) 172 Atl. 635; Sugars v. Ohio Match Co.,
(Idaho 1933) 23 P. (2d) 743 (The element of discontinuous employment
must be considered). The rule is applied under varying circumstances in
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The second factor to be considered in determining the average an-
nual earnings of the injured employee is the previous earning record of
other employees of the same or .similar class, in the same or similar
employment in the same or neighboring locality. This element fits
squarely into the situation of seasonal employment and affords an ex-
peditious and reasonable method of computation under those circum-
Stances. It is not, however, particularly adapted to the conditions found
to exist during a period of depression. Employment during a depres-
sion is not equal for men of the same class engaged by the same em-
ployer, to say nothing of the inequality of employment existing among
men of the same class employed by divers employers. To premise a
standard or a rule upon such dissimilar employment experiences would
be to open the way to unjust and capricious awards..2 6 It would then
be possible to compute the average annual earnings of a worker, un-
employed for substantially the whole of the preceding year, upon a
basis which included the experience of a worker employed during a
substantial portion of the preceding year. Obviously such computation
would defeat the end intended by the legislature, and so the Wiscon-
sin court has ruled.
The qualification in the act providing for computation on the basis
of an eight hour day is not mandatory in the sense that it must be ap-
plied to computation under depression conditions. It provides that an
eight hour day shall be used as the standard, unless a day of fewer
hours has been established through agreement or custom. Many em-
ployers throughout the depression voluntarily adopted share-the-work
plans in order that a greater number of workers might be self-sup-
porting. These plans necessitated a reduction in the daily hours worked
per man. The courts, in most instances, have held that this reduction
in daily hours was created either by law or by agreement, and have
directed that compensation be awarded for loss of earning capacity as
it existed at the time of the injury.2? In the absence of an express
statutory provision to the contrary, this is the most reasonable and
just interpretation. To hold otherwise would be to work a palpable
injustice and raise a serious question as to the constitutionality of the
the following cases; Remnnert v. Weidenineyer, 196 App. Div. 529, 188 N.E.
52 (1933); Orlando v. Snider Packing Corp., 230 App. Div. 557, 246 N.Y.S.
226 (1930); Geroux v. McClintic-Marshall Co.; 225 App. Div. 434, 233
N.Y.S. 402 (1929).
26 "The insurance carrier, who has rights and obligations under the statute, may
charge premiums only on the basis of the current payroll; and yet if other
years of greater or less activity were permitted to lessen or increase its obli-
gations, the result would be not only unjust to the carrier or to the claimant,
as the case might be, but the very solvency of the insurance carrier might bejeopardized." Bodowski v. Atlas Steel Casting Co., 237 App. Div. 667, 263
N.Y.S. 255 (1933).
27 Builders' Mutual Casualty Co. v. Ind. Coinni., 213 Wis. 246, 251 N.XW. 446
(1933).
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statute. It is just as obvious that it would be improper to compute the
average annual wage upon the basis of some other workers' employ-
ment experience. The only fair method, the only method which sub-
stantially carries out the purpose of the statute, is that method which
results in a figure most nearly approximating the true or actual loss
suffered by the employee. As pointed out previously, there was no
standard of employment during the depression. Few workers had like
records of employment. Thus it was necessary to determine the con-
tract or agreement of employment existing between the injured em-
ployee and the employer at the time of the injury, and, in conjunction
with the previous earnings of that employee, compute the wage loss
upon these factors alone.
The courts, in their attempts to retain the original purpose of the
act, have been forced to apply as best they could a law which was not
drafted in contemplation of depression conditions. The vague and in-
definite character of the act, as applied to the conditions under dis-
cussion, has placed the courts in a delicate position. Faced with con-
stitutional restrictions upon their powers, they have attempted to stay
within the prescribed limits in their efforts to establish a method at
once practicable and legal. This has been particularly difficult in con-
nection with the problem of occupational diseases. Though from a soci-
ological viewpoint it may be more desirable to administer compensation
in these cases according to some other plan, the legislature has failed
to provide the necessary method. The complicated problems attending
the matter of occupational disease have occasioned great concern and
no little specious reasoning on the part of the courts. The difficulty here
has been to determine just when disability begins and where liability
shall attach. Since the courts cannot originate law, they have been
forced to apply the strict interpretation of the term "disability." Thus
the "time of the accident" in cases of occupational disease is held to
be that time when the employee is forced to quit work because of his
affliction. It may be suggested that potential disability began long in
advance of this actual disability, perhaps during a period when the
average annual earnings of the employee were greatly in excess of the
amount at the "time of the accident." It may also be suggested that
such potential disability began under another employer, and if so such
other employer should contribute proportionately in the award. This
situation is not uncommon during depression conditions, but in the
absence of a contrary intent in the act the employer under whom the
"accident" occurred is held to full liability. Unable to apply the exist-
ing statutes otherwise, the courts have persistently called attention to
the need for more definite legislation upon these matters.2 s
28 The court in Wis. Granite Co. v. Ind. Connr,., 214 Wis. 328, 252 N.W. 155
(1934), calls attention to the lack of specific statutory direction concerning
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Where the methods outlined under (a) and (b) were not applicable,
computation of wage loss during the depression has been administered
under a modified form of method (c). Where circumstances have per-
mitted, the average annual earnings have been computed on the basis
of the previous earnings of the injured employee coupled with the
earning records of other employees of the same class in the same em-
ployment in the same locality. Where circumstances were not such as
to admit of a strict application of this method, the computation was on
the basis of the previous earnings of the employee and the conditions
of his employment at the time of the accident. In the last analysis, the
courts have directed that the award must be consistent with the actual
impairment of earning capacity, i.e., the actual economic loss suffered
by reason of the accident. In the majority of states the methods out-
lined under (a) and (b) have been disregarded except in instances
where continuous employment was experienced by- the principle em-
ploye or available to him and experienced by others. There exists a
minority group in which compensation has been awarded on a maxi-
mum basis.2 9 Average annual earnings in some of these states have been
computed as three hundred times the daily wage, disregarding entirely
the fact that the injured employee may have been unemployed for sub-
stantially all of the preceding year.30 In other states the average daily
compensation under depression conditions, particularly citing the vagueness as
to occupational disease.29 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. "Conrm., 130 Cal. App. 488, 19 P. (2d) 273 (1933);
Dept. of Water & Power, City of Los Angeles v. Industrial Accident Coin-
m"ssion, (Cal. App. 1933) 19 P. (2d) 832; Georgia Power Co. v. McCook, 48
Ga. App. 121, 172 S.E. 78 (1933); McKinstry v. Coal Coinfany, 116 Kan. 192,
225 Pac. 743, 28 A.L.R. 837 (1924) (The Kansas statute reads, "Compensa-
tion should be calculated for the period fixed by law whether the mine was
operated all of the time or only part time.") ; Miles v. Wyatt, (Kan. 1934) 28
P. (2d) 748; Aimerican Tobacco Co. v. Grider, 243 Ky. 87, 47 S.W. (2d) 735,(1932) (Ky. statute sec. 4905 requiring fixing of wages on "full time basis.");
Armstrong v. Lamar Lum:ber Company, 19 La. App. 816, 141 So. 805 (1932);
Barker v. Quachita Ice & Utilities Company, (La. App. 1933) 151 Southern
103, (When not employed by defendant, he worked for others.); Rylander
v. T. Smith & Sons, Inc., 177 La. 716, 149 So. 434 (1933); Durrett v. Unem-
ployment Relief Administration, (La. 1934) 152 So. 138; Young v. Unet-
ployment Relief Administration, (La. 1934) 154 So. 642; Suire v. Union Sul-
phur Co., (La. 1934) 155 So. 517; Modin v. City Land Comnpany, 189 Minn.
520, 250 N.W. 73 (1933) (Based definitely on word of Statute.) ; Coble v. Scul-
lin Steel Co., (Mo. App. 1932) 54 S.W. (2d) 777; Cote v. Bachelder-
Worcester Co., 85 N.H. 444, 160 At. (1932) (Statute provides for com-
pensation on "full time basis."); Bennett v. Fertlig, 162 Atl. 95 (1932)(Based on New Jersey statute.); O'Donnell v. South Fayette School Dist.,
105 Pa. Super. 355, 161 Atl. 887 (1932): Romig v. Champion Blower and
Forge Company, (Pa. 1934) 172 Atl. 293; Employers Liability Ins. Co.,
Ltd. v Williams, (Texas 1932) 56 S.W. (2d) 257 (Worked substan-
tially full time during preceding year.); State Road Comm. v. Ind.
Comm., 56 Utah 252, 190 Pac. 544 (1920); Morrison-Merrill & Company v.
Ind. Comm, 81 Utah 363, 18 P. (2d) 295 (1933).
30 The earlier Utah case of State Road Comm. v. Ind. Comm., 56 Utah 252,
190 Pac. 544 (1920) declares that no person can have an earning capacity
greater than the opportunities afforded by employment, but in Morrison-
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wage has been computed upon ihe basis of an eight hour day. It may be
said that in some of these states computation has been such because
of statutory direction,3 1 but in others it has been in apparent disregard
of the stated terms of the statutes, which generally provide that due
'regard must be given to previous earnings and the terms of the em-
ployment at the time of the accident.3 2 States administering their acts in
this manner have lost sight of the original purpose of this legislation.
Under these methods of computation there is no longer compensation
for loss actually sustained, but rather a scheme of insurance guarantee-
ing to the worker an award based upon a full time employment which
he did not enjoy prior to the accident.33
Under the circumstances, it seems that the better reasoning is that
if employment was not staggered, if it was not intermittent, and if it
was not discontinuous, it would not be fair to invoke that provision
of the statutes which gives minimum compensation but, by the same
token, where there is no work available, and the regular employment
of the employee is intermittent, staggered, and occasional, certainly it
is unfair to allow compensation on the basis of full time employment.
Where statutory provisions permit recovery of compensation on the
full time basis, even though employment is irregular, no fault can be
found with the decision of the courts, but where the statute specifically
provides that awards shall be allowed only on the basis which "reason-
ably represents the actual -earning capacity at the time of the injury
or disability," then fairness, equity, and a reasonable consideration of
the statute dictate that compensation should be allowed on the basis
of actual earnings during the preceding year in accordance with the
method of making calculations as specified by statute, not, however,
below its minimum recovery provision.
Merrill& Co. v. Ind. Comm., 81 Utah 363, 18 P. (2d) 295 (1933), by vir-
tue of an amendment providing that the average weekly wage be .computed
by multiplying the daily wage by three hundred and dividing by fifty-two,
the previous holding was overthrown and computation was made upon the
maximum basis.
31 Rylander v. Smith & Sons, Inc., 177 La. 716, 149 So. 434 (1933) (Compensa-
tion was granted on a full-time basis by virtue of a statutory provision.)
Cf. -Durrett v. Unemployment Relief Adm., (La. 1934) 152 So. 138 (Here the
court avoided the effect of the statute, holding that it applied only in the ab-
sence of an agreement limiting the number of work-days per week.); Suire
v. Union, Sulphur Co., (La. 1934) 155 So. 517 (A code limiting working hours,
adopted under the federal act, takes precedence over the statute and compen-
sation must be based on the mandatory week of 42 days). Georgia Power
Co.-v. McCook, 48 Ga. App. 121, 172 S.E. 78 (1933) (Compensation granted
on full-time basis because of statute); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Ind. Comtm.,
130 Cal. App. 488, 19 P. (2d) 273 (1933); Cal. Casualty & Indemnity Exchange
v. Ind. Comm., 135 Cal. App. 746, 27 P. (2d) 782 (1933) (In the last two
cases, however, it does not affirmatively appear that the claimants were unable
to secure employment additional to that shown by the record).32 Allis Chalmers Mfg. Co. v. Ind. Cemnnr.; Marshall v. Andrew F. Mahoney Co.,
both supra note 17.3 3 Rc-nig v. Champion Blower & Forge Co., (Pa. 1934) 172 At. 293.
